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ABSTRACT 
Unemployment was singled out by John Maynard Keynes as one of the principle faults of 
capitalism; the other is excessive inequality. Obviously, there is some link between these 
two faults: because: since most people living in capitalist economies must work for 
wages as a major source of their incomes, inability to obtain a job means lower income. If 
jobs can be provided to the unemployed, inequality and poverty will be reduced—
although such policy will not directly address the problem of excessive income at the top 
of the distribution. Most importantly, Keynes wanted to put unemployed labor to work—
not digging holes, but in socially productive ways. This would help to ensure that the 
additional effective demand created by government spending would not be exhausted in 
higher prices as it ran up against bottlenecks or other supply constraints. Further, it would 
help maintain public support for the government’s programs by providing useful output. 
And it would generate respect for, and feelings of self-worth in, the workers employed in 
these projects (no worker would want to spend her days digging holes that serve no 
useful purpose). President Roosevelt’s New Deal jobs programs (such as the Works 
Progress Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps) are good examples of such 
targeted job-creating programs. These provided income and employment for workers, 
actually helped increase the nation’s productivity, and left us with public buildings, dams, 
trails, and even music that we still enjoy today. As our nation (and the world) collapses 
into deep recession, or even depression, it is worthwhile to examine Hyman P. Minsky’s 
comprehensive approach to resolving the unemployment problem. 
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1. KEYNESIAN THEORY AND FULL EMPLOYMENT POLICY 
 
Since the publication of John Maynard Keynes’s General Theory, it has been recognized 
that unemployment is not only a persistent feature of the capitalist economy, but worse, 
there are no endogenous market processes that would eliminate unemployment. To be 
sure, the classical economists had always recognized the importance of the “reserve army 
of the unemployed” to discipline labor, and they had avoided promulgating any theory of 
labor market clearing. Further, David Ricardo had famously worried that labor-saving 
capital might cause ubiquitous labor redundancy, Thomas Malthus had developed a 
(somewhat illegitimate) theory of a tendency for markets to face insufficient demand, and 
Karl Marx’s two departments approach offered a variety of reasons to suspect that 
capitalism would not generate full employment. Still, it was Keynes who provided the 
clearest explanation of the problem: firms produce only the quantity of output they expect 
to sell and it would be highly unlikely that this would happen to coincide with full 
employment.  
According to Keynes, even if unemployed labor bids down wages, this will not 
induce firms to hire more labor than they need to meet expected demand for their output. 
It is even worse than that, however, because the existence of a preference for highly 
liquid assets (like money) tends to force the economy to achieve equilibrium (defined as 
the level of employment at which expected sales revenue is just sufficient to induce that 
level of production) before reaching full employment. The exact reason for that is 
complex and beyond the scope of this paper. What is most important is to understand 
Keynes’s main point, which is that unemployment is not caused by faulty operation of the 
labor market (such as sticky wages, lazy workers, generous welfare benefits, or low 
levels of training and education). In other words, he (like the classical economists 
Ricardo and Marx) did not see unemployment as a simple “market failure.” Instead, 
unemployment results from insufficient effective demand and can only be resolved by 
creating more jobs—which in turn requires higher demand for the output that would be 
generated by the additional workers. In other words, unemployment is “normal,” 
resulting from the operation of market forces, thus; can be resolved only through   3
purposive social policy well-targeted to raise aggregate demand and provide jobs for the 
unemployed. 
Unemployment was singled out by Keynes as one of the principle faults of 
capitalism; the other is excessive inequality. Obviously there is some link between these 
two faults: because most people living in capitalist economies must work for wages as a 
major source of their incomes, inability to obtain a job means lower income. Keynes also 
worried about excessive income at the top of the income distribution—which he 
attributed to high unearned income (what he called rentier income) mostly accruing to 
owners of financial assets. This paper will not address that issue but instead will look in 
detail at unemployment and its consequences. If jobs can be provided to the unemployed, 
this will go a long way toward reducing inequality and poverty, although such policy will 
not directly address the problem of excessive income at the top of the distribution. 
Many followers of Keynes have seen the solution to unemployment as various 
demand stimulating policies: more government spending, lower taxes, or lower interest 
rates to encourage private spending, most prominently investment. Clearly when 
aggregate output is far below potential—as it was in the 1930s—raising aggregate 
demand is called for. The global economic downturn in 2008 caused most economists to 
return to Keynes’s theory as almost everyone supported fiscal stimulus policies in 
stagnating nations around the world. However, as an economy gets closer to full 
employment, it becomes far less clear that policy to raise aggregate demand should be 
adopted. The main objection is that if unemployment gets too low, inflation will result 
because firms will start bidding up wages to hire the more desirable workers (in short 
supply because most skilled workers will have already obtained jobs—although those 
with fewer skills and less work experience might remain unemployed). Since 1960, this 
fear—represented by the supposed Phillips curve trade-off (lower unemployment can 
only be purchased through higher inflation)—has been perhaps the major barrier to 
achieving full employment. It has caused economists and policy makers to resist policy 
that would actually achieve full employment. 
Keynes was well aware of this problem. While he argued that “true inflation” 
occurs only when aggregate demand rises beyond the full employment level, he also 
argued that prices and wages could rise long before that point. Indeed, he believed that   4
the lower limit to unemployment that could be achieved by raising aggregate demand 
would probably be about 5%—trying to reduce unemployment below that level through 
the use of general macroeconomic policy would be likely to generate inflation. For this 
reason, he rejected general “pump priming” (that is, general policies to raise aggregate 
demand through a combination of tax cuts, government spending increases, or lower 
interest rates) in favor of “targeted” spending programs. Unfortunately, many of his 
followers neglected this warning, believing that Keynesian policy relies solely on “pump-
priming.”  
Keynesian policy fell out of favor during the 1970s, when stagflation (a 
combination of high unemployment and high inflation) afflicted many developed nations, 
for the simple reason that it appeared that Keynesian policy was no longer useful: to fight 
inflation, aggregate demand should be reduced, while to fight unemployment government 
ought to increase aggregate demand. But actually the problem was that Keynes’s 
followers had failed to follow his theory closely enough: he did not recommend general 
demand pumping as the one-size-fits-all solution to unemployment, nor did he believe 
that price hikes result solely from excessive demand. 
During the Great Depression, Keynes famously remarked that if the government 
could find nothing better to do, it could hire one group of workers to dig holes to bury 
money, and then hire another group to excavate the money that would be used to pay 
their wages. This might seem to be a rather silly policy proposal, and Keynes meant it to 
be just that. What he was saying is that first, given the low levels of effective demand and 
the high levels of unemployment in the 1930s, virtually any paid work would be an 
improvement—it would provide jobs and incomes to the unemployed, raising aggregate 
demand and stimulating the economy. Thus, even something as seemingly useless as 
digging holes would be beneficial. Second, he was using such a ridiculous example to 
spur policy-makers to come up with more useful projects—surely even the dumbest 
politicians or economists could come up with something better than digging holes!  
Finally, what is often overlooked is that Keynes’s comments were predicated on 
the conditions that existed in the Great Depression—massive unemployment and idled 
factories. Those workers burying or uncovering money would be able to increase their 
consumption and the factories would easily increase output to meet that extra demand.   5
Thus, it really wasn’t necessary for those newly employed workers to produce anything 
useful—all they needed was income to stimulate producers to use idle capacity. But such 
conditions do not usually exist, even in highly developed economies, and certainly not in 
developing economies—where unemployment can exist even with productive facilities 
operating with little excess capacity. In other words, outside depressions and deep 
recessions, it usually would not be a good policy to employ people in useless activities 
because their labor would be needed to help provide a portion of the extra output they 
would buy with their new incomes. Otherwise, simply paying them to do useless things 
would be likely to cause inflation as their consumption competed with the consumption 
by workers actually producing the goods everyone wanted. 
Thus, what Keynes really advocated is targeted spending—focusing government 
spending on areas that are operating well below capacity and as well directing spending 
toward increasing capacity to meet social goals. Most importantly, he wanted to put 
unemployed labor to work—not digging holes, but in socially productive ways. This 
would help to ensure that the additional effective demand created by government 
spending would not be simply exhausted in higher prices as it ran up against bottlenecks 
or other supply constraints. Further, it would help to maintain public support for the 
government programs by providing useful output. And it would generate respect for, and 
feelings of self-worth in the workers employed in the projects (no worker would want to 
spend her days digging holes that serve no useful purpose). President Roosevelt’s New 
Deal jobs programs (such as the Works Progress Administration and the Civilian 
Conservation Corp) are good examples of such targeted job creating programs. These 
provided income and employment for workers, actually helped increase the nation’s 
productivity, and left us with public buildings, dams, trails, and even music that we still 
enjoy today. 
 
2. THE EMPLOYER OF LAST RESORT JOB GUARANTEEE PROGRAM 
 
Some economists (and others) have long called for a more comprehensive and sustained 
approach to dealing with the perennial problem of unemployment. The government could 
stand by to hire any workers not needed in the private sector or by existing government   6
operations. This has been called a job guarantee, or the employer of last resort (ELR) 
proposal. A job guarantee program is one in which government promises to make a job 
available to any qualifying individual who is ready and willing to work. Qualifications 
required of participants could include age range, gender, family status, family income, 
educational attainment, residency, and so on. The most general program would provide a 
universal job guarantee in which government promises to provide a job to anyone legally 
entitled to work.  
Many job guarantee supporters see employment not only as an economic 
condition but also as a human right. Wray and Forstater (2004) justify the right to work 
as a fundamental prerequisite for social justice in any society in which income from work 
is an important determinant of access to resources. Harvey (1989) and Burgess and 
Mitchell (1998) argue for the right to work on the basis that it is a fundamental human (or 
natural) right. Such treatments find support in modern legal proclamations such as the 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the United States Employment 
Act of 1946 and its Full Employment Act of 1978 (other developed nations have similar 
laws that commit government to achieving full employment). Amartya Sen (1999) 
supports the right to work on the basis that the economic and social costs of 
unemployment are staggering with far-reaching consequences beyond the single 
dimension of a loss of income (see also Rawls 1971).  
  A key proposition cited by these advocates is that no capitalist society has ever 
managed to operate at anything approaching true, full, employment on a consistent basis. 
Further, the burden of joblessness is borne unequally, always concentrated among groups 
that already face other disadvantages: racial and ethnic minorities, immigrants, younger 
and older individuals, women, people with disabilities, and those with lower educational 
attainment. Since markets do not operate to achieve full employment, and because 
markets tend to leave behind the least advantaged members of society, government 
should and must play a role in providing jobs to achieve social justice. Proponents of a 
universal job guarantee program operated by the federal government argue that no other 
means exists to ensure that everyone who wants to work will be able to obtain a job. 
There are different versions of the ELR method of guaranteeing jobs. Harvey 
(1989) would provide a public sector job to anyone unable to find work, with the pay   7
approximating a “market wage,” whereby more highly skilled workers would receive 
higher pay. In Hyman Minsky’s (1965) proposal, developed further at The Center for Full 
Employment and Price Stability, University of Missouri-Kansas City and independently 
at The Centre of Full Employment and Equity, University of Newcastle, Australia, the 
federal government provides funding for a job creation program that would offer a 
uniform hourly wage with a package of benefits (Wray 1998; Burgess and Mitchell 
1998). The program could provide for part-time and seasonal work, as well as for other 
flexible working conditions as desired by the workers. The package of benefits could 
include health care, child care, payment of Social Security taxes, and usual vacations and 
sick leave. The wage would also be set by congress or parliament and a rate increase 
would be approved—much as the minimum wage is currently legislated in the United 
States.  
The perceived advantage of the uniform basic wage is that it would limit 
competition with other employers as workers could be attracted out of the ELR program 
by paying a wage slightly above the minimum wage. The most highly skilled workers 
would be most appealing to the private sector, so would be recruited first. Since the 
uniform wage paid in the ELR program would be well below the market’s pay for skilled 
workers, these would have a big incentive to get out of the ELR program as quickly as 
possible. For this reason, the ELR program would not be in competition with the private 
sector for any workers except those with the lowest skills and work experience. 
Benefits include poverty reduction, amelioration of many social ills associated 
with chronic unemployment (health problems, spousal abuse and family break-up, drug 
abuse, crime), and enhanced skills due to training on the job. Forstater (1999) has 
emphasized how ELR can be used to increase economic flexibility and to enhance the 
environment. The program would improve working conditions in the private sector as 
employees would have the option of moving into the ELR program. Hence, private sector 
employers would have to offer a wage and benefit package at least as good as that offered 
by the ELR program. The informal sector would shrink as workers become integrated 
into formal employment, gaining access to protection provided by labor laws. There 
would be some reduction of racial or gender discrimination because unfairly treated 
workers would have the ELR option. However, ELR by itself cannot end discrimination.   8
Still, it has long been recognized that full employment is an important tool in the fight for 
equality (Darity 1999). 
Finally, some supporters emphasize that an ELR program with a uniform basic 
wage also helps to promote economic and price stability. ELR will act as an automatic 
stabilizer as employment in the program grows in recession and shrinks in economic 
expansion, counteracting private sector employment fluctuations. The federal government 
budget will become more countercyclical because its spending on the ELR program will 
likewise grow in recession and fall in expansion. Furthermore, the uniform basic wage 
will reduce both inflationary pressure in a boom and deflationary pressure in a bust. In a 
boom, private employers can recruit from the ELR pool of workers, paying a mark-up 
over the ELR wage. The ELR pool acts like a “reserve army” of the employed, 
dampening wage pressures as private employment grows. In recession, workers down-
sized by private employers can work at the ELR wage, which puts a floor to how low 
wages and income can go. 
Critics argue that a job guarantee would be inflationary, using some version of a 
Phillips curve argument according to which lower unemployment necessarily means 
higher inflation (Sawyer 2003). Some argue that ELR would reduce the incentive to 
work, raising private sector costs because of increased shirking, since workers would no 
longer fear job loss. Workers would also be emboldened to ask for greater wage 
increases. Some argue that an ELR program would be so big that it would be impossible 
to manage it; some fear corruption; others argue that it would be impossible to find useful 
things for ELR workers to do; still others argue that it would be difficult to discipline 
ELR workers. It has been argued that a national job guarantee would be too expensive, 
causing the budget deficit to grow on an unsustainable path (Aspromourgous 2000; King 
2001). However, proponents have argued that these critics do not understand the proposal 
(see Mitchell and Wray 2005 for responses to these critiques). First, they do not see the 
difference between general demand pumping (which can be inflationary even before full 
employment is reached) and targeted spending (hiring only the unemployed that the 
private sector does not want to hire). Second, they do not understand the putting in place 
a wage floor (the ELR wage) only prevents wages from falling, but cannot cause private 
sector wages to rise. Third, they do not recognize the countercyclical nature of the   9
government’s spending on the program—automatically stabilizing the economy as ELR 
spending rises in recession and falls in expansion. Finally, they do not understand that a 
sovereign government can always financially afford to buy anything offered for sale—a 
topic we examine later in this paper. 
There have been many job creation programs implemented around the world, 
some of which were narrowly targeted while others were broad-based. The American 
New Deal included several moderately inclusive programs including the Civilian 
Conservation Corp and the Works Progress Administration. The New Deal employment 
programs created jobs for 3.6 million workers—helping to reverse the Great Depression 
and stimulating some private job creation (however, even these programs were too small 
given the severity of the depression; full recovery did not occur until WWII spending 
brought the U.S. economy to—and beyond—full employment). Sweden developed broad 
based employment programs that virtually guaranteed access to jobs, until government 
began to retrench somewhat in the 1970s—still, Sweden operates its economy very close 
to full employment by providing a variety of job-creating programs at relatively high 
wages (Ginsburg 1983). In the aftermath of its economic crisis that came with the 
collapse of its currency board, Argentina created Plan Jefes y Jefas that guaranteed a job 
for poor heads of households (Tcherneva and Wray 2005). The program successfully 
created two million new jobs that not only provided employment and income for poor 
families, but also provided needed services and free goods to poor neighborhoods. More 
recently, India passed the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (2005) that 
commits the government to providing employment in a public works project to any adult 
living in a rural area. The job must be provided within 15 days of registration and must 
provide employment for a minimum of 100 days per year (Hirway 2006). Supporters of 
ELR will be closely following India’s implementation of this new job guarantee. 
 
3. IS FULL EMPLOYMENT AFFORDABLE? 
 
One of the most vexing issues surrounds the belief that while government job creation 
programs might be desirable, government cannot afford them. On one hand, this belief 
appears somewhat strange. Sweden has long maintained that because it is a small nation,   10
it cannot afford unemployment—it needs to have all of its adult population contributing 
to production in order to be able to maintain high living standards. Unemployment is very 
costly—not only in terms of lost output, but also in terms of all of the social ills that 
accompany unemployment, including crime, family break-up, and physical and 
psychological health problems. Critics of government employment programs probably 
would agree with these positions, but ask where the government will get the money to 
pay for job creation. In this section we briefly examine whether a sovereign government 
can pay for an ELR program. Here we define a sovereign government as one that issues 
its own currency (the Canadian dollar in the case of Canada; the U.S. dollar in the case of 
the United States) and that operates without a pegged exchange rate (its currency is not 
fixed to gold or to foreign currencies). While many people believe that a government’s 
spending is constrained by its ability to collect taxes and sell bonds (“borrow”), that is 
actually not correct for a sovereign government. 
Supporters of ELR argue that a sovereign nation operating with its own currency 
in a floating exchange rate regime can always financially afford an ELR program (Wray 
1998). So long as there are workers who are ready and willing to work at the program’s 
wage, the government can “afford” to hire them. It pays wages by issuing checks or by 
directly crediting bank accounts of the workers. At the same time, it credits the reserves 
of the workers’ banks. A sovereign government taxes by debiting bank accounts of 
taxpayers (either directly when taxes are paid “on-line” or after receiving bank checks 
written by taxpayers) and by debiting reserves of the taxpayers’ banks. If government 
credits more accounts than it debits through tax payments, a deficit results. Budget 
deficits then mean that workers and taxpayers have net credits to their deposit accounts. 
Similarly, there will be net credits to the banking system, held as bank reserves. If the 
reserve holdings are excessive, banks bid the overnight rate down. The government can 
then either choose to let the overnight rate fall to its support rate, or it can intervene to 
sell interest-paying bonds at the desired support rate; this will drain excess reserves. In no 
sense is the government spending on ELR constrained either by tax revenues or the 
demand for its bonds.  
Nor will spending on the ELR program grow without limit. As discussed above, 
the size of the ELR pool of workers will fluctuate with the cycle, automatically shrinking   11
when the private sector grows. In recession, workers shed by the private sector find ELR 
jobs, increasing government spending and thereby stimulating the private sector so that it 
will begin to hire out of the ELR pool. Estimates by Harvey (1989) and Wray (1998) put 
net spending by the government on a universal ELR program at well under 1% of GDP 
for the United States; Argentina’s Jefes program peaked with gross spending at 1% of 
GDP (this figure undoubtedly overstates net spending because in the absence of the Jefes 
program government would have had to provide more spending on other anti-poverty 
programs). One of the fundamental flaws of capitalism is that it is unable to generate 
enough jobs for everyone who wants to work. For this reason, it is the government’s 
responsibility to supplement private job creation with direct employment programs. The 
employer of last resort proposal provides a novel approach to ensure that there is always 
a job available for anyone who wants to work, but is unable to find employment in the 
private sector. 
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